The Elusive Quest for Global Justice by Foley, Edward B.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 2 Article 1 
1997 
The Elusive Quest for Global Justice 
Edward B. Foley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward B. Foley, The Elusive Quest for Global Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 249 (1997). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Elusive Quest for Global Justice 
Cover Page Footnote 
Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. Many thanks to Marty Flaherty and 
Tracy Higgins for organizing this symposium and for their thoughtful comments. This article grows out of 
earlier work presented at the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, the Georgetown Biennial Colloquium on 
Constitutional Law, and the Mershon Center Colloquium on World Affairs; my thanks to the organizers and 
participants of those fora, especially Anne Alstott, Richard Briffault, Jim Fleming, George Fletcher, Kent 
Greenawalt, Stan Laughlin, Thomas Pogge, Andrej Rapaczynski, Peter Strauss, and Mark Tushnet. I also 
thank my colleagues John Quigley, Allan Samansky, and Peter Swire for their helpful comments and 
suggests. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/1 
SYMPOSIUM
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
Edward B. Foley*
INTRODUCTION
T ET us take as a given that all humans, regardless of nationality,
a have equal intrinsic worth. The question is whether this principle,
which I shall call intrinsic equality, requires giving the United Nations,
or some comparable global institution, the authority to impose world-
wide redistributive taxation for the benefit of the world's poorest peo-
ple. Although others have suggested that it should,' I shall argue that
it does not.
At first, I, too, believed that justice for all humanity required a
global legislature with taxing powers analogous to those of the United
States Congress. Congress has these powers because the intrinsic
equality of all U.S. citizens requires the existence of a national legisla-
ture with the authority to enact nationwide redistributive taxation for
the benefit of the poorest Americans.2 Once it is accepted that all
humans around the world are intrinsically equal in exactly the same
way as are all U.S. citizens, it would seem to follow that there ought to
be a global legislature with worldwide taxing powers equivalent to the
nationwide taxing powers of Congress.
To be sure, within the United States there is a lively dispute over
how heavy the redistributive tax burden should be, and correspond-
ingly how generous should be the benefits to the nation's poorest citi-
zens. But this dispute is precisely why it is necessary to have a
democratic legislature with the authority to decide this issue. As long
as the members of Congress are elected democratically, a fair process
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. Many
thanks to Marty Flaherty and Tracy Higgins for organizing this symposium and for
their thoughtful comments. This article grows out of earlier work presented at the
Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, the Georgetown Biennial Colloquium on Consti-
tutional Law, and the Mershon Center Colloquium on World Affairs; my thanks to
the organizers and participants of those fora, especially Anne Alstott, Richard Brif-
fault, Jim Fleming, George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Stan Laughlin, Thomas Pogge,
Andrej Rapaczynski, Peter Strauss, and Mark Tushnet. I also thank my colleagues
John Quigley, Allan Samansky, and Peter Swire for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 128, 151-53
(1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls 240, 250-51 (1989); David AJ. Richards,
International Distributive Justice, in Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law
275, 292 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
2. For arguments explaining why intrinsic equality requires giving Congress the
power of redistributive taxation, see Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy
and Disagreement (1996), and Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights 225-308 (1993).
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exists for determining the nation's level of redistributive taxation.
The legislature is free to set the level high or low, and, wherever the
level is set, the fundamental principle of equal citizenship has been
satisfied.
Now, some argue that the level of redistributive taxation cannot fall
below a certain minimum level without violating the equal intrinsic
dignity of all citizens. But even these advocates for the poor would
acknowledge that as long as this minimum threshold has been satis-
fied, the democratic legislature must have the discretion to decide
whether or not to be more than minimally generous.4 Moreover, vir-
tually no one would claim that the legislature must be denied the au-
thority to adopt redistributive levels more generous than the bare
minimum. Thus, Congress has the authority to adopt high rates of
progressive taxation for the purpose of making available a high level
of guaranteed minimum income to all U.S. citizens. Congress may
choose not to exercise this authority (to exceed the minimum), but the
authority unquestionably exists.
And so, to repeat the basic problem: if all humans in the world are
intrinsically equal in the same way that all U.S. citizens are, then a
global legislature should have the same authority to adopt generous
levels of redistributive taxation that Congress has. Most Americans,
of course, would strongly object to the idea that a global legislature
should be empowered to tax their wealth for the benefit of the desti-
tute in other parts of the world. Indeed, even those affluent Ameri-
cans who accept that Congress should have the power to tax them for
the benefit of less fortunate Americans reject applying the same idea
on a global scale. Perhaps their resistance to worldwide redistributive
taxation is simply a selfish failure to recognize the moral force of the
fundamental principle of intrinsic. Perhaps, in other words, if Ameri-
cans were truly good, they would embrace the idea of giving a global
legislature the same taxing power that Congress has.5
3. Of course, to be truly fair, a citizen's formal right to an equal vote must be
supplemented by an egalitarian system of electoral finance, one which gives citizens
equal opportunities to attempt to influence the electoral process in accordance with
their own electoral preferences. I have discussed this point in detail in another article.
See Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Cam-
paign Finance, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1204 (1994).
4. For example, in a recent work the preeminent political philosopher John
Rawls has acknowledged that while a decent minimum standard of living is a "consti-
tutional essential," a more extensive redistribution of wealth is a program that a legis-
lature reasonably could reject-and therefore must be free to do so. See John Rawls,
Political Liberalism 228-29 (1993).
5. Before such a global legislature could come into existence, the issue of repre-
sentation would need to be resolved. The U.N. General Assembly is presently struc-
tured according to the principle of one nation, one vote. But before the General
Assembly acquired any powers of taxation, this method of representation would need
to change, as populous countries clearly would object to taxes imposed on them by
countries with small populations. Thomas Franck has recommended that the General
Assembly be reformed along the same lines as the U.S. Congress, so that it is a bicam-
[Vol. 66
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
In this essay, however, I argue to the contrary. I claim, instead, that
there are good reasons for rejecting the idea of worldwide redistribu-
tive taxation even if we wholeheartedly affirm the principle of intrinsic
equality. As I explain, the analogy between national and global gov-
ernment breaks down. There are reasons for holding national govern-
ments responsible for the welfare of their citizens that do not apply on
a global scale. Thus, while equality among citizens of a nation-state
requires a national government with redistributive taxing power, the
equality of all humans does not entail a comparable global
government.6
I. OBSTACLES TO A GLOBAL STATE
The world is simply too big for it to be subject to a single global
economic management. The rich nations of the world cannot prevent
the poor nations from continuing to mismanage their own economies.
If the poor nations were to adopt certain economic policies, including
population control and investment in human capital, those nations
could considerably improve the living standards for their peoples. But
it is impossible for the rich nations to ensure that the poor nations
implement sound economic policies. Indeed, the lesson of the Somali
debacle is that rich nations cannot even guarantee that people living in
the poorest nations will have enough food to eat-at least not without
massive and sustained military intervention that will cost many
soldiers their lives and result in a neo-colonialist regime.7 And if the
rich nations cannot guarantee even enough food to survive, it is obvi-
ously impossible for the rich nations to guarantee that the poor
nations wiln implement sensible population control policies or will in-
vest enough resources in educating their own citizenry.
To put the point even more starkly, the example of Somalia shows
the inability of the United Nations to guarantee effectively a funda-
eral legislature, one chamber of which has representation structured on the basis of
population, while the other one adheres to the formula of one nation, one vote. See
Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 483-84 (1995).
Franck, however, has not argued that, even as reformed in this way, the General As-
sembly should be given any power to impose binding laws-at least not initially. Id.
6. In considering whether justice requires a global legislature with the power of
redistributive taxation, this essay obviously tackles a large enough subject without
having to take on other issues that might be thought to fall within the scope of globaljustice.
7. As two knowledgeable commentators have aptly observed, the first and fore-
most lesson from the Somali experience is that "there is no such thing as a humanita-
rian surgical strike." Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of
Humanitarian Intervention, Foreign Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 70, 82. The authors of
this commentary-one of whom was deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in
Somalia during the ill-fated operation, and the other of whom is a professor at
Princeton University-go on to acknowledge that to guarantee success in a situation
like Somalia would require updating the colonialist concept of "trusteeship" to permit
the United Nations, with its own army, to take over governance of a country whose
own regime has failed to protect its people from starvation. Id. at 84.
19971
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mental human right to adequate nutrition. If such a right is to be
meaningful, it must be enforceable even when there is a collapse of an
organized and functioning civil government in a particular locality, as
was the case in Somalia. The need to eat remains regardless of polit-
ical circumstances. Thus, if for whatever reason, civil unrest occurred
in Mississippi, and as a result low-income citizens in Mississippi were
in danger of starvation, the federal government would send in federal
troops to stop the unrest and guarantee the safety of the citizens. In
short, a right to adequate nutrition could be meaningfully enforced by
the federal government in the domestic context of the United States.
But, as the lesson of Somalia demonstrates, there can be no compara-
ble guarantee of meaningful enforcement in the international context.
For decades, international development organizations have tried to
encourage the poorest nations to adopt economic policies that will im-
prove the standard of living for their peoples. Thus far, the results of
these efforts have not been encouraging, particularly in Africa, still
the poorest continent.' Political corruption and ineptitude among lo-
cal elites have largely prevented sound development policies from tak-
ing root.9 Even if international development agencies so desired,
there would be no way to impose sound economic policies on these
nations. To enforce such measures would require the invasion of oc-
cupation armies far greater than anything imaginable in previous his-
tory, and even then there would be no guarantee of success.
But without any guarantee of sound economic management in the
poor nations of the world, there is no possibility of worldwide redis-
tributive taxation analogous to the kind that occurs within each na-
tion-state. Simply put, the citizenry of affluent nations are not going
to agree to tax themselves if the revenue will be wasted on corrupt
dictators and their cronies, with no benefit ever reaching the unfortu-
nate peoples of these nations. And who can argue with this conclu-
sion? There can be no moral duty to give to the poor if it is impossible
to get the money into the hands of the poor (instead of the corrupt
elites in the local government).
The inevitable conclusion, then, is that each nation must be ulti-
mately responsible for its own economic destiny. Indeed, consider
this startling fact: at the beginning of this century, the level of per
capita income for both the United States and Argentina was roughly
8. See Carol Lancaster, Economic Reform in Africa: Is It Working?, 13 Wash. Q.
115, 117 (1990) ("By the end of the 1970s, the consequences of two decades of eco-
nomic mismanagement were beginning to figure not only in the declining rates of
agricultural growth but in the declining volumes of exports as well."). Moreover, crit-
ics of international aid organizations have argued that many of their policies and pro-
grams have been counterproductive. See Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The
Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (1997).
9. See John Darnton, "Lost Decade" Drains Africa's Vitality, N.Y. Times, June
19, 1994, at Al; Peter Passell, New Ideas Go Beyond Handouts in the War on African
Poverty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1997, at D2.
252" [Vol. 66
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
the same.' ° At the time, it would have been impossible to predict that
almost a century later, one nation's per capita income would be about
quadruple the other's ($23,240 to $6050, respectively)." Just because
the United States has consistently managed its economy better than
Argentina has, it does not follow that Americans ought to pay redis-
tributive taxes to Argentineans to equalize the gap in their per capita
income. Instead, the people of Argentina should look to their own
national government to get their own economic house in order, so that
they can adopt national redistributive taxes that will improve the lives
of their poorest citizens.
Similarly, today Nepal and Uganda have roughly the same per cap-
ita income ($170).12 If over the next decade, however, one of these
two countries adopts economic policies that enables it to grow much
richer than the other, while the other country continues the misman-
agement of the past, why should the citizens of the well-managed
country be forced to pay taxes to send to those living in the ill-man-
aged regime? Instead, those living in the well-managed country, in-
cluding its poorest citizens, should reap the rewards of their superior
policies, and the citizens of the other country should encourage their
government to adopt similarly successful policies.
Perhaps this point is self-evident, but in any event I shall elaborate.
Assume that today two countries, Acadia and Barbaria, have exactly
the same population size, ten million, and exactly the same per capita
income, $1000. Thus, the aggregate national income of both countries
is the same: $10 billion. Suppose further that both countries are able
to double their aggregate national income during the next twenty
years. But during that same time period, Acadia doubles the size of
its population, while Barbaria maintains zero population growth.
Thus, at the end of twenty years, Acadia still has a per capita income
of $1000, while Barbaria has doubled its per capita income to $2000.
Surely, the Barbarians should not be required to share their extra in-
come with the Acadians just because Acadia failed to adopt the same
population policy as Barbaria.
10. See Richard Reeves, The Brutal Phannmet of Argentina, The Record, Mar. 9,
1990, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; see also Editorial, Time
of Hope in Argentina, Washington Post, Nov. 1. 1983, at A10 (noting that Argentina's
standard of living was at least as high as that of the United States at the turn of the
century). As the Post observes, although Argentina is one of the world's richest coun-
tries in terms of natural resources, it has "kicked away great prosperity through per-
verse and repeated political mistakes." Id.
The same point is made more generally by David Henderson, in an article in which
he makes a number of comparisons among nations in their differential abilities to
undertake economic development. His general point is that a nation's policy choices,
and not its natural resources, determine its economic fate. See David R. Henderson,
Economic "Miracles," Society, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 59.
11. World Bank, World Development Report 1994, at 162-63.
12. Id.
1997]
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Similarly, suppose instead that both countries maintain a zero rate
of population growth over the twenty-year time period, but Barbaria
adopts a national savings rate double that of Acadia. The higher sav-
ings rate-which translates into increased investment in education, in-
frastructure, and other forms of capital-causes Barbaria to have a
higher rate of economic growth than Acadia. As a result, at the end
of two decades, Barbaria's aggregate national income is double that of
Acadia, $40 billion instead of $20 billion. Thus, Barbaria has a per
capita income of $4000, compared to $2000 for Acadia. Again, it
seems apparent that the Barbarians' extra income should not be taxed
for the benefit of the Acadians. Acadia could have adopted the same
savings rate that Barbaria did, but it did not. The Barbarians should
not be penalized for Acadia's poor policy choices. 3
The argument might be made that because the children of Acadia
did not choose the disastrous economic policies that failed to increase
their country's per capita income, these children should not suffer on
account of these policies. The problem with this argument, however,
is that if the Barbarians are going to be required to share their wealth
with Acadian children, then Barbaria is going to insist upon having
the authority to force Acadia to adopt sensible economic policies in
the future. "We will not waste our money bailing out Acadia," the
Barbarians will say, "unless we have reasonable assurances that Aca-
dia will not mess up again."14
But consider the implications of giving Barbaria the authority to
control the choice of Acadia's economic policies. Suppose, again, that
a primary reason for Acadia's low per capita income is its high fertility
rate. Should Barbaria have the authority to insist that Acadia adopt a
zero rate of population growth? And what if Acadia fails to comply,
in part because Acadia's cultural values are different from Barbaria's?
Should the Barbarian army have the authority to sterilize Acadians to
make sure that compliance occurs? One shudders at the thought,
which Acadians would rightly denounce as the worst sort of neo-
colonialist nightmare. But, then, if the Barbarians cannot enforce
compliance with high-growth economic policies, the consequence is
that Barbarians cannot be expected to share their wealth with Acadia.
13. John Rawls has made a similar point in an as-yet-unpublished revision of his
essay The Law of Peoples. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Mar. 22, 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). The original version is collected in On Human
Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, at 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley
eds.) [hereinafter Rawls, The Law of Peoples]. James Buchanan uses a similar exam-
ple to discuss issues of immigration. See James Buchanan, A 7vo-Country Parable, in
Justice in Immigration 63-65 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
14. Examples of the same demand for accountability can be found much closer to
home. In my home state of Ohio, where the legislature has been ordered to raise
revenues for school districts in low-income counties, the legislature has insisted on
adopting measures that will make local school districts much more accountable for
their financial practices. See Catherine Candinsky, Governor Signs 2 School Measures,
Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 27, 1997, at 1C.
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After all, if Acadia is to be free to reject the policy of zero population
growth, then Barbaria must be free to reject sharing the benefits of
that policy with Acadians.
This point explains why the objection to global redistributive taxa-
tion does not apply with equal force at the level of the nation-state.
We can imagine a family with only one child objecting to having to
pay taxes to support a family with three children. "Because we choose
not to have as many children in order to be able to accumulate more
wealth per child," the small family might argue, "we should not have
our savings diminished in order to subsidize the decision of other fam-
ilies to have more children." This argument, indeed, may be persua-
sive, but the key point here is that within any nation-state, a
democratic legislature is free to accept or reject this argument. In the
context of the entire world, by contrast, the decisive objection is to the
existence of even an institution that has the power to decide whether
or not to adopt worldwide legislation concerning family size and the
distribution of wealth. 5
Thus, the children of Acadia ultimately must rely on the elders of
their own country to provide for their welfare. They cannot look to
the Barbarians to save them from the economic mistakes of their el-
ders. The implication of this conclusion is that the Acadian children
may be left in misery, but this misery is the price of the freedom that
Acadia must have to choose its own destiny, without the imposition of
Barbarian colonialism.
Now, if Acadia lacks a democracy, even its adult citizens reasonably
may claim that they cannot ensure that their government will adopt
sensible economic policies, and if they cannot control their country's
economic policies, then they should not suffer as a result of the mis-
taken choices their leaders make on their behalf. The remedy for this
situation is to institute democracy within all the countries of the world,
so that each country can be held responsible for its own economic
15. There are obviously important and difficult questions of domestic constitu-
tional law concerning the powers of a democratic national legislature to enact certain
population control policies or compulsory education standards. These constitutional
questions, which must be left for another occasion, suggest potential problems with
some forms of redistributive taxation even on a national level. If citizens of a nation-
state have inviolable constitutional rights to reproduce as many children as they wish,
or to refuse to educate them in ways that will make their children economically self-
sufficient, then it becomes difficult to justify taxing other families to support the chil-
dren of these (arguably) irresponsible families. I have touched on this issue to some
extent in Edward B. Foley, Social Justice and Child Poverty, 57 Ohio St. .J. 485, 488-
94 (1996).
Nonetheless, the important point to remember here is that any objection to domes-
tic redistributive taxation based on this point is a policy objection-Congress still has
the power to adopt the taxes if it wishes. In contrast, the problem at a global level is
constitutional in the sense that, whatever global constitutional structure ideally ought
to replace the current U.N. Charter, this "ideal constitution for the world" would not
include a global legislature (elected on a worldwide democratic basis) with the power
to impose worldwide progressive income taxes.
1997]
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destiny, rather than to impose worldwide redistributive taxation. 16
The problem with this remedy, however, is that it is unfortunately im-
possible for the United Nations to guarantee a democratic form of
government to all the nations of the world. The United Nations can-
not guarantee democracy even for Hong Kong, much less for the
whole of China. It is thus obvious that the United Nations cannot
guarantee democracy for the whole world.
To be sure, the United Nations (or the United States acting unilat-
erally) might be able to force some small and relatively powerless
countries to adopt democratic forms of government. But even the
U.S. experience with Haiti should raise a note of caution. It is ex-
traordinarily difficult for a foreign power to foster the cultural condi-
tions necessary for a democracy to sustain itself. Moreover, even if
success were possible in an isolated case or two, it would seem utterly
infeasible to sustain the endeavor on a worldwide basis. Again, the
invasion of military forces necessary to impose democracy on all the
small countries of Asia, Africa, and South America would stretch the
capacities of the industrialized democracies-Europe, North America,
Australia, and Japan-far beyond anything worth contemplating.
The unavoidable truth is that ultimately each nation of the world
must be responsible for its own political as well as economic fate. The
clamor for democracy must come from within. The people of each
country must find within themselves the power to insist upon a demo-
cratic form of government. They cannot expect the United Nations to
impose a democracy upon their rulers.
Thus, the low-income undemocratic nations of the world are caught
in a kind of catch-22. Without democracy, these nations cannot expect
the affluent democratic nations to join them in a global regime with
16. Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize-winning economist at Harvard University, has
written that democracies are much more likely than dictatorships to prevent situations
in which some of their people are starving to death. This is true even when democra-
cies have little wealth and then suffer natural disasters, like droughts, that easily could
lead to famine. As Sen explains, "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history
of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a demo-
cratic form of government and a relatively free press." Amartya Sen, Freedoms and
Needs, The New Republic, Jan. 10 & 17, 1994, at 31, 34.
To support his point, Sen compares how two African democracies, Botswana and
Zimbabwe, responded to crop failures worse than those occurring in two dictator-
ships, Sudan and Ethiopia:
Sudan and Ethiopia, with comparatively smaller declines in food output, had
major famines. Botswana and Zimbabwe had none. The happy outcome in
the latter countries was largely the result of timely and extensive famine-
prevention policies by these latter countries. And democracy, which in-
cluded a relatively uncensored press, made such policies imperative. For had
the governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe failed to do this, they would
have come under severe criticism from the political opposition. The Ethio-
pian and Sudanese governments, by contrast, did not have to reckon with
such democratic inconveniences.
Amartya Sen, Freedom Favors Development, 13 New Persp. Q. 23, 25 (1996).
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the authority to tax rich nations for the benefit of the poor. The afflu-
ent democracies will rightly object that unless democracy exists in the
poor countries of the world, there can be no guarantee that any redis-
tributive payments will benefit the people of the poor regimes in con-
trast to the elite. In addition, the affluent democracies have a
legitimate ground to oppose any taxation adopted by a global regime
that itself is not thoroughly the product of democratic elections
(which, of course, it would not be since the representatives to the
global legislature from the undemocratic nations would, by definition,
not be elected through a democratic process). Thus, there can be no
global redistributive taxation without democracy in all the nations of
the world.
But if there is democracy in all the nations of the world, then there
is no longer any justification for global redistributive taxation. This is
the catch-22. If there is democracy in every nation of the world, then
each national government should be held responsible for its own eco-
nomic performance. If some democracies choose to have higher rates
of population growth, or lower rates of national savings, than the
worldwide average, then these democracies should be accountable for
their choices. The rest of the world should not be forced to give up
some of their economic advantages because of the low-income policies
that some democracies have chosen for themselves.
In sum, there is no moral imperative for global redistributive taxa-
tion equivalent to domestic redistributive taxation within each nation-
state. It is true that we are witnessing an era of rapidly increasing
"globalization" of economic forces, and thus it is tempting to think
that some day soon there should exist a global government with pow-
ers of taxation equivalent to those now held by a national legisla-
ture. 7 But for all the increase in international trade and investment,
there are still fundamental obstacles to the possibility of a worldwide
democratic legislature that determines economics and social policies
for the entire globe. The military authority necessary to enforce uni-
form global economic policies-empowering U.N. troops to control
population growth rates, for example-is obviously not the kind of
powers that people are prepared to entrust to a global government.
The reasonable fear of global tyranny is much too great. Yet without
a power to determine global economic policies, there is no basis for a
worldwide legislature with the authority to impose worldwide redis-
tributive taxation.
17. In 1994, for example, the annual report of the U.N. Development Programme
("UNDP") ambitiously urged the creation of a "global social safety net," to be fi-
nanced by an income tax on the world's richest nations. See United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, Human Development Report 1994, at 78.
1997]
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II. A GLOBAL RESOURCE TAX
Still, there seems something wrong in saying that global justice does
not require any global taxation at all. Some nations may have greater
per capita income than others, not because of superior economic poli-
cies, but simply because they happen to possess more valuable natural
resources. But if all humans in the world have equal intrinsic worth,
regardless of nationality, as the principle of intrinsic equality holds,
then it would seem wrong for some humans to have greater wealth
than others just because their nation's soil happens to contain greater
natural resources than the soil of other nations. In other words, if the
principle of intrinsic equality is to be upheld, there must be some way
for all the people of the world to share the natural resources of the
world. The world itself and all the stuff within it belong equally to all
of us, regardless of national boundaries, and thus there must be some
global mechanism to distribute to everyone his or her fair share of the
profits from mining the natural wealth of the world.
For this reason, I support the idea of a global resource tax.18 This
tax, set by an international treaty, would collect a portion of the price
of any natural resource extracted from any nation of the world. The
price would reflect the value of the natural resource in its unrefined or
unprocessed state, before being put to use in any way by human inge-
nuity. The treaty, which would determine the percentage of these
prices to be collected by the tax, would require the unanimous consent
of all nations to be truly global in scope.19
Of course, there would be tremendous difficulties in implementing
any such global resource tax, not to mention the difficulties in getting
all the nations of the world to consent to one.20 But these practical
18. Similar taxes have been proposed by Thomas Pogge and Brian Barry. See
Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in Nomos XXIV: Ethics,
Economics and the Law, supra note 1, at 219; Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law
of Peoples, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 195 (1994).
19. It is possible that a global resource tax would have the effect of requiring poor
nations to send money to rich ones. This would occur if poor nations extract more
natural resources per capita than affluent nations, which might happen if poor nations
rely heavily on mining operations as their primary source of income, while the afflu-
ent countries rely on the product of human capital (like computer software,
pharmaceuticals, and other high-tech industries).
While this result might seem a bit disturbing at first, upon reflection it is just as it
should be. If all the world's natural resources belong to all the people of the world,
then no country-not even a poor one like Nigeria-should be able to appropriate
these natural resources for its own benefit without reimbursing the other nations for
their fair share of these resources. That Nigeria happens to be poor, while Japan is
affluent, does not negate this conclusion. It simply means that Nigeria should adopt
policies designed to encourage the formation of human capital, just as Japan has done.
Those nations, like Japan, which have successfully developed their human capital
should not be denied their fair share of the world's natural wealth just because they
have been successful in this respect.
20. One very important practical difficulty is how to determine what counts as a
natural resource. For example, should the fact that a particular nation is blessed with
[Vol. 66
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difficulties do not negate the principle.21 If all the nations of the
world decided to act justly, out of a common respect for the principle
of intrinsic equality, rather than out of their own narrow self-interests,
then all the nations of the world would unanimously agree to some
such global resource tax.' Thus, it is important to declare that, in
principle, a commitment to global justice requires the adoption of at
least one form of global tax, namely, a global resource tax.'
But it is also important to make clear that a global resource tax, no
matter how ambitious it might be, is a far cry from the kind of redis-
tributive taxation that the legislatures of nation-states impose on their
own citizens. A resource tax is designed to share only the value of the
raw materials themselves. It is not designed to share in whatever
value is added by subsequent human manipulation of the materials.
Nor, obviously enough, is it an attempt to capture any value from
human labor or intellectual property that never becomes mixed with
raw materials as part of some manufacturing process. Thus, a re-
source tax is nothing like an income tax, which many democratic na-
tions impose on their own citizens, and which is designed to spread the
wealth deriving from human endeavors as well as natural resources.
Income taxes presuppose to some extent that all citizens of a nation
are engaged together in the common enterprise of improving the
wealth of the nation as a whole. 4 While this presupposition is appro-
priate for each democratic nation-state, it does not apply to the globe
as a whole, which can make no common democratic decisions con-
cerning economic and social policies. Thus, at most, all the people of
the world can agree to share the natural wealth of the world. They are
not in a position to share the income that results in large part from a
set of investment and other economic decisions that they have made
collectively in the common enterprise of democratic self-government.
Moreover, the proceeds of a global resource tax need not be distrib-
uted on a per capita basis, as the proceeds of a domestic income tax
surely should be. Rather, the treaty establishing a global resource tax
a natural harbor, perfect for shipping, count as a taxable natural resource? Or what
about a nation's climate favorable for farming or tourism? I am inclined to consider
these as natural resources, no less than oil, gold, or timber, but I leave a resolution of
this issue aside for purposes of this essay.
21. The principle that the earth's resources belong to all the people of the earth
has been recognized at least with respect to natural resources mined from the sea.
Sixty countries have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 10, 1982, 21 I.LM. 1261
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). The United States, however, is not yet one of
them.
22. Similar in principle to this resource tax would be an environmental damage
tax, assessed on activities that have the effect of harming the world's environment.
23. In addition, there clearly would need to be some sort of method of repara-
tions, requiring those nations who exploited natural resources in the past to reimburse
the rest of the world for what they have already taken.
24. The requirement of social solidarity as a predicate for redistributive taxation
within a nation-state is a point emphasized in John Rawls's A Theor' of Justice (1971).
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
might establish appropriate population levels for each nation of the
world and thus would distribute the proceeds from the tax in accord-
ance with these benchmark population levels, regardless of the actual
population in each nation. By contrast, any fair system of wealth re-
distribution within a single nation-state would ensure that every per-
son below the poverty line participates on equal terms in the
redistribution program, regardless of the nation's rate of population
growth.
Thus, as important to global justice as the adoption of a global re-
source tax may be, one should not confuse this idea with the idea of a
worldwide wealth redistribution program analogous to those in place
within each nation-state. Even if the former is required in principle,
the latter is not. Therefore, the demands of global justice can never
be as extensive as the demands of social justice within each nation-
state.25
III. LIMITS ON MIGRATION
The global poor, however, may not be satisfied with a global re-
source tax. They may look to the affluent nations of the world and see
them enjoying a standard of living much greater than their own, de-
spite their receipt of proceeds from the global resource tax. The afflu-
ent nations may have greater prosperity because of lower birth rates
or higher rates of savings. Either way, the global poor may wish to
emigrate to these more prosperous nations.
Thus, the question inevitably arises whether it is just for the affluent
nations of the world to limit immigration from the poorer nations. 26 If
the principle of intrinsic equality holds true, then should not the
United States and other affluent nations open their borders to anyone
who wishes to come, without regard to nationality? After all, if a per-
son born in Bangladesh has the same intrinsic worth as a person born
in Boston, then should not the native of Bangladesh have the same
inalienable right to live in Boston, if he so desires, as the Boston na-
tive does? The cultural opportunities of living in Boston may be
unique, and why should the intrinsically equal native of Bangladesh be
deprived of these opportunities on account of an accident of
birthplace?
The problem, however, with opening an affluent nation's borders to
unlimited immigration is that it would destroy the possibility of any
meaningful redistributive taxation within the nation-state. In a world
with open borders, if a particular nation-state imposes a high rate of
25. There is a question as to whether a global resource tax should be paid to any
nation controlled by a corrupt and dictatorial government. In this situation, this na-
tion's share of the tax might be held in trust for it until such time as the people of the
nation were able to benefit from the proceeds of the tax.
26. For an important collection of essays on this specific topic, see Justice in Immi-
gration, supra note 13.
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domestic taxation for purposes of subsidizing the minimum hourly
wage of its inhabitants,27 high-skill workers will tend to emigrate to
nation-states with lower rates of domestic taxation and low-skill work-
ers will tend to immigrate to collect the benefits of the subsidized min-
imum wages. These tendencies will cause the pool of tax revenues for
redistribution to dissipate, as there are fewer and fewer people from
whom to collect the taxes and more and more people arriving to share
the revenues. Equilibrium is reached when the amount of the tax or
subsidy is equal to the cost of relocation. If the cost of relocation is
fairly low, as it is when transportation costs decrease because of tech-
nological advantages, it becomes obvious that a world of open borders
leaves little room for domestic wealth redistribution policies.2
Thus, if there is to be any meaningful wealth redistribution at all,
each nation-state must be permitted to restrict immigration and emi-
gration. As long as it is impossible to have worldwide wealth re-
distribution at the level of a single global state, wealth redistribution
must occur at the level of each nation-state. And if wealth distribu-
tion is to occur at this level, each nation-state must be permitted to
close its borders to immigration and emigration.29 Thus, the conclu-
sion is inescapable: there is no possibility of distributive justice in a
world of open borders."
All this may be true, but is it consistent with the fundamental princi-
ple of intrinsic equality? Why should the native of Bangladesh accept
27. The current Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") is an example (however im-
perfect) of a redistributive wage subsidy program. On the EITC, see Anne L Alstott,
The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1995).
28. Economists have long been familiar with this phenomenon. See Henry J. Rai-
mondo, Economics of State and Local Government 113-16 (1992). In addition, sev-
eral of the essays in Justice in Immigration, supra note 13, discuss this and other
points relating to the economics of immigration policy. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The
Welfare Economics of Immigration Law, in Justice in Immigration, supra note 13, at
158, 171 ("It is certainly plausible that unrestricted migration into developed coun-
tries such as the United States, coupled with full entitlement for all immigrants to the
public safety net programs, would create a sizable incentive for migration quite apart
from any labor market opportunities, particularly for residents of countries with low
standards of living and few safety net programs.").
29. I discuss here only migration for economic reasons and leave aside the sepa-
rate problem of political refugees. For a discussion of this separate issue, see Justice
in Immigration, supra note 13.
30. Mark Tushnet reaches the opposite conclusion, but that is because he consid-
ers it possible to establish a global government that would implement the require-
ments of worldwide distributive justice. See Mark Tushnet, Immigration Policy in
Liberal Political Theory, in Justice in Immigration, supra note 13, at 147, 150-51, 155,
156 n.10. He states: "If we knew what worldwide distributive justice required, and
sought to achieve it, immigration policy would surely seem quite secondary." Id. at
151. In a sense, I agree with him completely: If I accepted his premise that it were
possible to achieve global distributive justice through global institutions of govern-
ment, then I, too, would advocate open borders across nations. But having rejected
the premise for the reasons stated in part I, supra, I cannot share his conclusion that
restrictions on immigration are unnecessary for distributive justice.
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this reasoning if it still deprives him of the right to move to Boston,
the city of his dreams? Perhaps the logic is faulty, and we should rea-
son from a right of open borders to the necessity of a unified world
state, rather than from the impossibility of such a state to the necessity
of closed borders.
If the obstacles to a single world state were only practical or tempo-
rary, I would assert this view. But the obstacles seem permanent and
insurmountable, even purely as a matter of principle. The idea of a
single world state, with the power to set population and education pol-
icies for the entire globe, is objectionable on grounds of human lib-
erty, as I have already indicated in part I. The risk of tyranny is too
great to justify such an omnipotent institution. The centralization of
military power necessary to ensure that the global government gets its
way on matters of economic and social policy makes the idea inher-
ently obnoxious." Thus, we must start with the premise that a single
global state with full redistributive powers is unattainable, and then
reason to the conclusion that closed borders are necessary, rather than
attempting to justify a single global state as necessary to preserve the
right to open borders.
This conclusion, as depressing as it may be, can be reconciled with
the fundamental principle of intrinsic equality by invoking the idea of
the original position, articulated by the philosopher John Rawls.3"
Rawls himself has been reluctant to apply this idea on a global scale,33
but, like many others, I have never understood why not.34 Indeed, it
would seem that if we are truly committed to the idea of intrinsic
equality, we inevitably are led to the belief that the parties in the orig-
inal position should be the members of the entire human race choos-
ing principles of global justice designed to regulate a fair system of
international law. After all, if national identity is morally irrelevant to
a person's intrinsic equal worth as a human being, as the principle of
intrinsic equality maintains, then the original position should be con-
structed in such a way that national identity is irrelevant to an individ-
ual's status as an equal participant in the original position. Thus, the
31. As Fernando Tes6n has observed, Kant recognized this truth long ago. See
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 53,
87 (1992). Rawls also makes this point in his The Law of Peoples essay. See Rawls,
The Law of Peoples, supra note 13, at 54-55.
32. For those unfamiliar with this idea, an excellent introduction can be found in
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (1990). Very briefly, the idea of
the original position is to imagine ourselves behind a "veil of ignorance," such that we
are ignorant of any knowledge of our own personal circumstances or characteristics.
All we know are general facts about human nature and history. Imagining ourselves
in this situation, we are to ask ourselves what principles of justice we would insist
upon in order to protect ourselves from being subjected to injustices once the "veil of
ignorance" is lifted. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 32, at 118-92.
33. See Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 13, at 54-55.
34. See Beitz, supra note 1, at 128, 151-53; Pogge, Realizing Rawls, supra note 1, at
240, 250-53; Richards, supra note 1, at 292.
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original position should be understood as encompassing all the per-
sons of the world, and the veil of ignorance should prevent knowledge
of their national identities along with all other identifying information.
But just because the original position should be global in scope, it
does not follow that global justice requires the creation of a unified
global state with the powers heretofore associated with separate
nation-states. This is the key point, and this is precisely where I part
company from other followers of Rawls. Charles Beitz, Thomas
Pogge, and David Richards all believe that globalizing the original po-
sition requires globalizing the Rawlsian principle of distributive justice
that the rich should be taxed for the benefit of the poor."- But this
belief is mistaken. Even if it is true that invoking the idea of the origi-
nal position at the level of the nation-state requires nationwide redis-
tributive taxation, as Rawls famously argued in A Theory of Justicel
globalizing the original position does not yield an analogous require-
ment of global redistributive taxation.
On the contrary, recognizing the unacceptable threats to human lib-
erty that a unified global state would present, the parties to the origi-
nal position would adopt principles of global justice that call for the
existence of separate, sovereign nation-states. The number and bor-
ders of these nation-states might not conform exactly to what the par-
ties would find in existence once the veil of ignorance were lifted, and
thus behind the veil they would adopt principles of global justice con-
cerning the recognition of sovereign states in international law. These
principles would permit the modification of borders or even secession
or annexation, as circumstances warranted.37 Nevertheless, the crucial
point remains that the parties in the original position would adopt
some system of separate and sovereign states, rather than a single
global state.
Having made this fundamental choice, the parties would then rec-
ognize the necessity of permitting these separate and sovereign states
to close their borders to immigration and emigration. Thus, the par-
ties would understand, even if regrettably, that the fundamental need
to protect human liberty from global despotism requires restricting
the liberty of movement from one sovereign state to another. One
unavoidable consequence of the human condition is simply that there
35. In Rawlsian terminology, these philosophers believe that the parties to the
original position would adopt the so-called "difference principle," which requires im-
proving as much as possible the lot of the most impoverished. See Pogge, Realizing
Rawls, supra note 1, at 240-42, 274-75; Richards, supra note 1, at 275, 292. In an
economy that permits the existence of private property, this Rawlsian difference prin-
ciple requires the existence of redistributive taxes that take from the rich and give to
the poor.
36. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 32.
37. See Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort
Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (1991); Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and
Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48, 69-75 (1992).
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can be no fundamental human right to live anywhere in the world one
wishes. We are, from the moment of birth, inevitably constrained by
our national identities, much as we are inevitably constrained by our
genetic endowment.
To be sure, the parties in the original position would adopt some
measures to counteract the accident of birthplace, like the kind of
global resource tax we have considered. The principle of intrinsic
equality insists that the resources of all the world belong to all of us,
even if we cannot demand the right to relocate to any part of the
planet we prefer. Thus, ignorant about whether their particular local-
ity was blessed with abundant natural resources or instead cursed with
desolation, the parties in the original position would insist on global
mechanisms to share the world's natural wealth among all the people
of the world. But apart from measures of this type, the parties in the
original position would recognize that the responsibility for distribu-
tive justice must lie with the separate, sovereign nation-states and not
with any unified global regime. Each nation-state must be free to de-
termine its own population growth and education policies,"8 as well as
other policies concerning savings rates and capital investments, and
thus each must be free to establish its own separate income-sharing
programs.
Invoking the original position in this way shows that the conclusions
of this essay are consistent with the fundamental idea of intrinsic
equality. Because a global original position has built into its very
structure the principle of intrinsic equality-each person in the world
has an equal status as a party to the global agreement adopted in the
original position-any principles of global justice that the parties in
the original position would adopt must be understood to satisfy the
fundamental idea that all humans have equal intrinsic worth. Thus, if
I am right that the parties in a global original position would reject the
idea of a unified world state with the powers currently associated with
nation-states, then rejecting this idea must be consistent with intrinsic
equality.
The lesson, then, is plain. Although we are all intrinsically equal in
our common humanity, we are not all citizens of a single global polity.
This conclusion may contradict the aspirations of some cosmopolitans,
but that is because cosmopolitanism attempts to derive too much from
38. Even if the parties in the original position would rule impermissible in any
country certain population growth or education policies-such as forced sterilization
or mandatory boarding schools-there are many other policies that would remain
optional at the discretion of each sovereign nation-state. For example, with respect to
population growth, a legislature can encourage or discourage fertility by subsidizing
or taxing the procreation of children. In the United States, the newly adopted tax
credit of $500 per child is an example of a subsidy that will, at the margins, encourage
adults to have more children than they otherwise would. Conversely, if Congress had
imposed on all parents a special tax of $500 per child, this tax would have the effect of
discouraging the procreation of additional children.
[Vol. 66
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
intrinsic equality.3 9 The idea of equal citizenship and the ancillary ob-
ligations of distributive justice among equal citizens must be reserved
for the members of the same democratic nation-state and do not ex-
tend across national boundaries to encompass all the people of the
globe.
IV. A Focus ON REGIONALISM
Where does all this leave us in the quest for global justice? I sug-
gest, for the time being anyway, that we focus our energies on region-
alism, rather than globalism.40 I once thought that regionalism was a
cop-out, a refusal to live up to our full responsibilities as members of
the human race. But I now think that there is much in the way of
justice to be done simply by following the maxim "love thy neighbor
as thyself." And we should not lose sight of the needs near home by
stretching the boundaries of our compassion beyond the breaking
point.
What does a regional focus entail for the United States? It entails,
first and foremost, figuring out an appropriate relationship between
ourselves and Mexico, our immediate neighbor, with whom we share
so big a border and yet so little else. It is not merely that we lack a
common language, but that our economic and political conditions are
so different. A huge disparity exists between our per capita income,
$23,240, and theirs, which is only $3470. " We have a flourishing, com-
petitive two-party democracy. Until very recently, they had an ossi-
fied one-party oligarchy, which has been plagued with electoral fraud
and other forms of corruption.42 It is no wonder that so many Mexi-
cans want to move to our country.
Forget about the children of Bangladesh. What about the children
of Mexico? Why should a child born in Tijuana not have the right to
move just up the road to San Diego? The case for open borders seems
so much more compelling when we are talking about a short walk of
several miles rather than a boat or plane trip halfway across the globe.
Of course, open borders between the United States and Mexico
would put tremendous pressures on U.S. income redistribution pro-
grams. Would Mexicans have the right to participate in Social Secur-
39. Martha Nussbaum, a prominent cosmopolitan, disclaims advocacy of a world
state. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in For Love of
Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism 2 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). Like many
of her critics, however, I see no point of invoking the idea of world citizenship without
the corollary idea of a world state.
40. A similar focus on regionalism is developed in Janna Thompson. Justice and
World Order 86-89 (1992), at 163.
41. World Bank, supra note 11.
42. See Michael C. Meyer & William L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican History694-96 (5th ed. 1995). Although the latest elections in Mexico suggest that Mexico is
making substantial strides toward the development of a fair and stable multi-party
democracy, it is still too early to say that Mexico has such a system firmly in place.
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ity, Medicare, and other U.S. efforts to obtain a fair society? These
programs are already under tremendous pressure, however, in part
from global economic forces that are causing increased disparities in
earning power between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Perhaps
it makes sense to continue the economic and political integration of
Mexico and the United States that began with NAFTA,43 so that we
can open the border to the free flow of people as well as goods and
capital and then design institutions which will protect the social secur-
ity of all people within North America. 4
Given the obvious hostility that would exist toward any further inte-
gration, it may seem fruitless to speculate about what conditions might
justify such attempts. Nonetheless, the pressures for further integra-
tion may become increasingly strong if immigration from Mexico to
the United States continues unabated despite American efforts to
stem the flow. Thus, even if it may be fanciful speculation, it is worth
considering what circumstances would have to prevail to justify a
claim that the United States should enter a North American Union
with Mexico and Canada, one that is comparable to the new Euro-
pean Union.
The first prerequisite for any North American Union would be for a
system of multi-party democracy to firmly take hold in Mexico and
then sustain itself for at least several decades. One cannot expect the
United States and Canada to integrate themselves with Mexico until
Mexico has shown that its commitment to multi-party democracy is as
entrenched and irreversible as it is in the United States and Canada.
The Mexican elections of July 1997, in which the PRI for the first time
lost control of the country's legislature, were obviously a promising
start to the development of a multi-party democracy, but Mexico
needs to develop a lengthy track record of fair elections in which con-
trol of both the legislature and the presidency change hands from one
party to another. Until then, it would be premature to expect Canada,
the United States, and Mexico to enter some kind of North American
political union of the type that is developing in Europe.
Exercising our imagination, let us suppose that fifty years from now,
Mexico can demonstrate a half-century of free and fair elections, with
43. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1994).
44. Immigration from Canada to the United States poses much less of an eco-
nomic threat than immigration from Mexico because the current standard of living of
Canadians is comparable to that of Americans. Thus, if Canada were integrated polit-
ically and economically with the United States, poor Canadians would not impose (on
a per capita basis) any extra strain on America's social security programs. Moreover,
the very fact that Canadians enjoy a standard of living comparable to Americans
greatly reduces the pressure for Canadians to migrate south. Perhaps one of the long-
term effects of NAFTA will be that, as the standard of living of Mexicans rises to
approach that of Americans, Mexicans will feel less pressure to migrate north for
economic reasons.
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a thriving multi-party system. What then might Mexicans reasonably
demand of the United States and Canada in terms of political integra-
tion on grounds of distributive justice? Suppose that, despite its dem-
ocratic advancements, Mexico still suffers from a lower standard of
living than either United States or Canada, and this gap still causes
many Mexicans to attempt to migrate north.
One might then imagine the transformation of NAFTA into a North
American Union whose constitution guarantees the citizens of Mex-
ico, the United States, and Canada free movement across borders and
whose legislature is empowered to adopt social security programs for
the citizens of all three countries. But as long as the standard of living
in Mexico is lower than in the United States or Canada, there obvi-
ously would be considerable resistance to any such union from many
people in the latter two countries. The question I wish to consider
here, however, is whether there should be such resistance. Or, in-
stead, should the people of Canada and the United States embrace
Mexicans as fellow citizens of a North American Union, regardless of
differences in standard of living, as long as Mexicans show a sufficient
commitment to multi-party democracy? 45
My own tentative view is that they should.46 Putting aside consider-
ations of self-interest, and considering only the demands of justice, we
should realize that the interests of each Mexican deserve to be treated
equally as the interests of each U.S. citizen. The principle of intrinsic
equality requires this. An American child is no more deserving of a
life of prosperity than a Mexican child simply because he or she had
the good fortune of being born north of the border. If you were
placed behind a veil of ignorance, so that you did not know whether
you were born in Mexico or the United States, you would want the
existence of institutional arrangements that equalized the life pros-
pects for children born in both countries. For this reason, once Mex-
ico establishes a sufficient commitment to democracy, Americans
have a moral duty to support institutional arrangements that will
make irrelevant which side of the border they are born on.
Of course, there is no denying that even apart from the sheer eco-
nomic self-interest of Americans, the obstacles to any political inte-
45. It is arguable, of course, that a North American Union should encompass the
countries of Central America and the Caribbean. But, for the sake of simplicity, I
leave aside this point.
46. For purposes of this speculation, I will assume also that fifty years from now
Mexico will have reduced fertility to what demographers call the -replacement
rate"-that is, the rate at which each generation merely replaces itself. (This replace-
ment rate would be equivalent to zero population growth were there no net immigra-
tion from abroad.) Although Mexico's current fertility rate of population growth is
somewhat higher than the U.S. rate, Mexico is projected to reach the replacement
rate by the year 2010. See World Bank, supra note 11, at 213. If this projection proves
correct, then there would be no basis for objecting to a North American Union on the
ground that Mexico has a inappropriately high rate of fertility. (Indeed, it is worth
observing that Canada is not projected to reach the replacement rate until 2030. Id.)
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gration with Mexico would be extraordinarily large-and perhaps
ultimately insurmountable. It might be, for example, that the cultural
differences between Mexicans, on the one hand, and Americans and
Canadians, on the other, are so vast as to make impossible even a
loose confederation of these three countries. But these cultural differ-
ences do not seem any greater than those between Germany and Por-
tugal, for example. If Europe proves successful in its attempt at
political integration, then perhaps there will be hope for North
America as well.
The question necessarily arises why continental government-en-
compassing all of Europe or North America-is the optimal size of
polity within which there should be freedom of migration and a com-
mon social security system for all. Why should such continental gov-
ernment be favored over the traditional nation-state? Or perhaps
even some smaller territory, like Scotland, Bavaria, or Tuscany? After
all, even before the nation-states of Europe were consolidated into
their current size, there were separate and independent principalities.
How is one to say as a matter of principle that it would be wrong or
unjust to return to units of sovereign states of this size, each of which
has the authority to close its borders to outsiders?
Perhaps there is no satisfactory way to answer this question. Rob-
ert Dahl, a leading theorist of democracy, has said as much: "[W]e
cannot solve the problem of the proper scope and domain of demo-
cratic units from within democratic theory."4 7 But I wish to venture
the following tentative argument in favor of continental government,
at least at this stage in human history.48
My argument is based on the proposition that the scale of govern-
ment should be as large as is humanly feasible, without creating an
exclusive monopoly of power in a single global state. I have rejected a
single unified world government as posing too great a risk of tyranny.
Continental government is the next level down in size.49 As long as
47. See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 207 (1989).
48. Continental government, of course, could be federal in nature, as is true in the
new European Union. Thus, the creation of continental government need not lead to
the destruction of the nations that comprise the federation. But as the experience of
federalism within the United States has shown, to be a so-called "sovereign" state
within a federal union is hardly the same as being a separate and independent state.
To be sure, the amount of power that states have within a federal union is variable
along a continuum. In other words, it is not a dichotomous alternative of either no
power or complete power. Thus, the power of the member states of a federated
North American Union could be considerably greater than the powers of the states
within the United States. Even so, there is no denying that were a federated North
American Union to come into existence, the power of the United States as an in-
dependent nation would be considerably diminished.
49. Because Asia is so vast, it might be necessary to divide it into several subconti-
nents. For example, I could imagine separating Asia into four subcontinents: north
(Russia and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States), south
(India and its neighbors), east (China and its neighbors), and west (the so-called
"Middle East"). These four would be added to North America, South America, Eu-
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each continent has its own sovereign government, with sufficient mili-
tary power to repel any aggression from the other continental govern-
ments, then there is no possibility that a single power could subject all
of humanity to a monolithic tyranny.
But, again, why my preference for continental government rather
than some smaller size? There are two main reasons. First, there
should be a preference for freedom of movement from one part of a
continent to another part. A general preference in favor of freedom
supports this view, and so does the principle of intrinsic equality.' No
subgroup of people within a single continent should be empowered to
deny access to a place that others might wish to live. The land as a
common natural resource belongs to all the people of the continent,
and thus individuals and families should be free to move about the
continent in accordance with their own desires.51 As a government
continental in scope is necessary if there is to be unfettered freedom
of movement throughout the continent, continental government
should be favored for this reason alone.
The demand for freedom of movement has more moral force today
than it once did. The phenomenal advances in transportation technol-
ogy since the industrial revolution are a contributing factor. In any
event, for whatever reason, borders between nations now seem as ar-
bitrary and artificial as borders between states within nations.
Although these borders may serve some useful purposes, they should
not act as barriers to people who wish to relocate elsewhere on their
continent.
The other major reason to favor continental government is also the
result of technology and the industrial revolution. The threat of pollu-
tion to the environment requires the existence of large-scale govern-
ments that were unnecessary before. Many major environmental
problems, like acid rain, are continental in scope and pay no heed to
the artificial boundaries between nation-states. Indeed, some of the
world's greatest environmental threats are global in scope (like global
warming), and the existence of a handful or so continental govern-
ments would make it much easier to negotiate and enforce multilat-
eral treaties for the protection of the global environment. It does not
take expertise in decision theory or group dynamics to realize that, for
purposes of entering and enforcing agreements to protect the world's
rope, Africa, and the Pacific Islands (including Australia) for a total of nine continen-
tal governments.
50. For further arguments in support of open borders, see Tushnet, supra note 30,
at 150-55. I agree with Tushnet's arguments insofar as they are applied on a continen-
tal, rather than global, scale. These arguments are derived from the basic premises of
liberal (and egalitarian) political theory, which I embrace.
51. A continental government should be able, if it wishes, to set up a system of
private property in land, but then any inhabitant of the continent should be free to
purchase any parcel of land at its fair market value regardless of whichever particular
region of the continent happens to be his or her birthplace.
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environment, it would be much better to have between five and ten
continental governments,5 2 rather than 185 or more independent
nation-states. When unanimity is required, as it would be for any mul-
tilateral treaty, the problems of "free riders" and "hold outs" increase
significantly as the number of parties involved rises. 53 Thus, there is a
significant danger that 185 separate countries are simply unable to
adopt and endorse successfully the regulatory measures that are nec-
essary to protect the world's environment. Conversely, it is quite
likely that five or ten continental governments could agree to mutu-
ally advantageous terms in the common interest of all humanity.
For this reason, above all others, it is important that Europe's ex-
periment at integration proves successful. If it is, then perhaps there
is reason to hope that the world might eventually consist of continen-
tal federations, each of which has a democratic federal legislature
elected by fair and competitive multi-party elections. In this situation,
global government could consist of a coordinating committee that op-
erates on the principle of unanimous consent of all the continental
federations. This coordinating committee would be the forum for
adopting worldwide environmental treaties, and perhaps it would take
on other functions, such as the protection of global security against
the outbreak of war among the several continental governments. In
this respect it would be like a modified version of the current U.N.
Security Council. It could also could be responsible for the kind of
global resource tax I have discussed in this essay.
But this global coordinating committee could never have the kind
of power that the continental governments might someday have. For
none of the continental governments, or their member nation-states,
would agree to give this global body a monopoly on the use of force.
The threat of the rest of the world ganging up against any one conti-
nent is simply too great for any continent to deny itself the military
capability to resist such aggression.
Thus, if one or more of these continental governments refuse to
operate democratically, or otherwise abuse human rights, there is ulti-
mately nothing that the rest of the world can do to stop them from
their abusive practices. The unfortunate but unavoidable truth is that
the democracies of the world will never be able to guarantee democ-
racy to the one-fifth of humanity that lives in China, which is large
enough to qualify as its own separate subcontinent.54 Given this truth,
we should concentrate on what we may be able to accomplish on our
own continent, and leave the fate of the people of China where it ulti-
mately must reside: in their own hands.
52. The exact number of continental governments would depend on whether or
not Asia would be divided into several subcontinents. See supra note 49.
53. This is an elementary principle of public choice theory. See Dennis C. Mueller,
Public Choice I (1989).
54. See supra note 49.
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CONCLUSION
All the people of the world are equal in their intrinsic moral worth.
There should be no disputing this fundamental humanitarian truth.
But despite this truth we are not-and, for the foreseeable future,
never will be-citizens of a unified global polity. The objections to
worldwide social legislation, enforceable by an omnipotent global mil-
itary, are so obvious and permanent that the idea would be ruled out
in a Rawlsian original position. In the quest for social justice, the
most that to which we could possibly aspire is the creation of conti-
nental governments that adopt fair social legislation for all the people
of a single continent-Europe, North America, Africa, and so forth.
Fair social legislation is the product of democratic government, and
democracy can only be secured, at most, on a continental basis. In-
deed, even the quest for continental government may prove too ambi-
tious, leaving the province of distributive justice confined to the
borders of each separate and independent nation-state.
This truth does not deny that democracy is a universal human right.
Indeed, I would contend that the right to participate as an equal citi-
zen in democratic elections is the most fundamental human right. It is
derived directly from the basic principle of intrinsic equality, and it is
ultimately from this principle that all human rights must flow. But
although democracy is a fundamental human right, it cannot be guar-
anteed to all humanity by some omnipotent global regime.
In the end, let us not be quixotic, hoping for a global constitutional
order that is unattainable. As much as we might wish it so, the gov-
emnment of the entire world can never mimic the government of the
United States. Instead, let us set our sights on something that might
actually be feasible: a North American Union, which, like the Euro-
pean Union, endeavors to secure democracy and prosperity for all the
people of a single continent.
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